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PEACE WITHOUT DISHONOUR^WAR ..^^ ^ 
WITHOUT HOPE. 






BEING 



A CALM AND DISPASSIONATE 

ENQUIRY 

INTO THE 

QUESTION OF THE CHESAPEAKE, 



AND THE 



NECESSITY AND EXPEDIENCY 



WAR. 



BY A YANKEE FARMER. 



.JI^'^^^jSoc': 



BOSTON: 
PR1J«JTED BY GREENOUGH AND STEBBINS. 

1807. 



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mi», Hiat. So«. 



TO THE PUBLICK. 

IT cannot he expected^ that a farmer should 
displaij the ornaments of a polished sfijle — The au- 
thor has aimed onhj at perspicuitij, impartiality^ and 
truth. A boldness and freedom characteristick of 
the real, ancient New-England farmers^ zoill be found 
stronglij marked in evcrij part of this little essaij. 
The publick good is the author^s onlij object — true 
patriotism his onhj stimulus — and the promotion of 
justice, and vindication of our national good faith, his 
only aim. 

In these times of party; spirit he cannot hope 
to escape censure. His love of truth — his display 
of our own errors — his disposition to render justice 
to other nations xmll probably be attributed to the 
basest motives — For such is too often the fashion of 
the day — to abuse those lohom hdc cannot answer. 

It would not surprise him, if he should even 
be called an Old Tory or a British hireling ; for he 
has often remarked that this is a species of argument 
which never fails of success, xohen all other reasoning 
or abuse is found ineffectual. But he shall despise 
the calumnies, and smile at the attacks of all the 
partizans of war, a few of zvhom, broken in fortune 
or reputation, can only hope to rebuild both on the 
ruins of their Country, 



TO THE FARMERS, MERCHANTS, AND 
MECHANICKS OF NEW-ENGLAND 



FELLOW CITIZENS, 

IF at any time a citizen is juftified in making an ap- 
peal to your underftanding, to your fober reafon — If a cool and. 
difpaflionate difplay of your danger, and your true interefts be at 
any period a duty, it furely becomes fuch, when you are threatened 
with a calamity by which your rights, liberties, property, and lives 
are to be expofed to the moft imminont danger. * We are told by 
the publick newfpapers which have ufually been the vehicles of the 
language of our adminiftration — we are alfo informed, that many 
very influential men in and out of the adminiftration, concur with 
the publick papers in declaring, " that War wiU probably take 
place, and that it is inevitable, unlefs the government of Great- 
Britain fhould make ample reparation for the attack on our frigate 
the Chefapcake." We alfo know, that all defcriptions of people in 
Great-Britain, however oppofed in political opinions, concurred in 
one fentiment, that Great-Britain never could, and never ought to 
yield the principle for which they believed that we contend, the 
right of enlifting and harbouring the defcrters from their publick 
fhips of war. It is rendered almoft certain, therefore, that Great- 
Britain, " while {he will explicitly difavow the claim to fearch our na- 
tional Jloips of war, will neverthelefs contend, that we have no right 
to enhft her deferters, and proteft them under our publick flag, 
but that if we do fo condud, and refufe to deliver them on demand, 
fhe will retake them by force, on a common jurifdidion, the High 

* See the language of the National Intelligencer, and of the Aurora, who 
confider war as inevitable, unlefs Great-Brit-iin grants reparation for the at- 
tack on the Chefapeake. Mr. Gallatin, A'Ir. Dearborn, and other publick offi- 
cers are alledged to have declared that war is to be cxpctiled. 



Seas.'' it lucU lli<)\ilcl bo her final dccilion, as we have reafon to 
fear, fhe cannot punifh Admiral Berkeley without manifeft injuftice 
to him. 

If, therefore, our adminiftration are fincerc in their determina- 
tion to go to war, unlefs reparation be made for the attack on the 
Chcfapcakf, war fccms, as tlicy privately alTert, to be inevitable, 
unlefs tlie prudent and temperate deliberations of Congrefs, or the 
feafonablc exprefTion of publick opinion, fliall check this deftruc- 
tivc, and I may add, rti/Ii policy. War, at all times a publick ca- 
lamity, becomes peculiarly alarming and dellruftive to a nation, 
which has been for twenty-four years exclufively devoted to the 
arts of peace — which has neglefted every mean of national de- 
fence — which has devoted none of its revenues to a wife prep- 
aration for war, to wliich all nations are occafionally expofed. 
It is peculiarly alarming to a nation, governed by an adminiftra- 
tion not only deftitute of mihtary talents, but who have always 
avowed their oppofition to every thing like mihtary preparation, 
and who, while they have profeffed to rely upon the moft frail of 
all fupports, the juftice of nations, and have therefore neglefted 
every mean of preparation or defence, have moft unfortunately 
brought us to the verge of a moft awful precipice, where we have 
no alternative but either to plunge headlong to a certain and de- 
ftruAive fate, or to retrace our fteps, as they fay, with ignominy 
and difgrace. If at a moment fo eventful, and in a pofition fo tre- 
mendous, any friendly hand (hould point out to us a path by which 
we might fave both our livee and our honour, one would naturally 
imagine, that it ought to excite our gratitude, rather than our ha- 
tred — to merit our thanks, rather than punifhment ; but other 
doftrines feem to prevail. The friends of the adminiftration, 
wounded at the true piAure of our fituation, provoked that any 
man fliould unanfwerably prove fome errors in our own conduft 
which diminifh the juftice, and of courfe, the neceflity of a war, 
have advanced an idea novel in the hiftory of free nations, that *" it 
is treafon to queftion the juftice or expediency of a war," even be- 

' F.xtrart from tlic Nationnl InteHiKcnccr In anfwcr to Pacificiis, a writer in 
t!ic Boflon CcntincI, af,'ain(l the necellity of War. 'Jhis may be found in tlif 
I'allailium, of .Si-ptembtr L"», in ;; piece entitled « Modem Liberty." 



fore the only conftituted authority authorized to decide this ques- 
tion, the Legiflature, had convened to deUberate upon it. 

The example of Great-Britain, whofe tyrannical principles have 
fo long been the theme of popular harangue, one would think would 
be conclufive on this point — and that whatever may be done tvith 
impunity in that monarchical and fevere government, might certainly 
be permitted in our free and enlightened country. It is well knawu 
that all the pubUck writers in England, both before and after the de- 
c'lfton of ParUament,^as to the quellion of war, undertake to arraign 
itsjuftice, its poHcy, its neceflity, its expedience, their own weaknefs, 
the means which they have of annoying }:he enemy, and to magnify 
the refources, power, and talents of their foes : nor can there be 
found, in a fingle inftance, an attempt to check this freedom of en- 
quiry, either by profecution or threats. 

If this example, and the explicit language of our own Conftitu- 
tions were not fufflcient authority, we might cite an illuftrious man, 
whofe opinions a large part of the community w^ould be unwil- 
ling to queftion. — Prefident JeflFerfon lays it down as an eftablifhed 
axiom, " that u.e utmoft liberty of the prefs may be fafely indulg- 
ed, in fuch a country as ours, and that errors in opinions can do no 
injury, luhere reafon is left free to combat them." 

If this doftrine be true in ordinary cafes, how much more ftrong 
its application to the important queftions of war and peace ? — To 
what terrible confequences would the tyrannical doftrine of the 
National Intelligencer, above quoted, lead us ? A foreign nation 
makes an attack which is alledged to be caufe of war : Such an 
attack muft always involve a queftion of fa£t, and a queftion of law 
or right. If the opinion of any particular fet of men, even of dig- 
nified officers, could be conchifive as to thefe t'wo queflions : If no pri- 
vate citizen who might be in poffeflion of better evidence as to the 
fadst or better authority as to the law, could divulge thefe fafts, 
and make known his principles of law, it would follow that our 
Conftltution would be a dead letter ; — the Legiflature would be- 
come mere tools in the hands of the executive, and the nation might 
be involved in all the calamities of war at the pleafure of a fingle 
man. But the doftrine of the Government paper goes farther, you 
ran not only not difcufs the queftion of right, but you muft be filent 



s 

a» to the refouiccb or ability of thr nation to gain the objeft of the 
war. The opinion of the Executive is conclufive on this point alfo. 
The National IntclHgenccr tells the people of the United States, 
that Great-Britain has done an unprovoled adit, which juftifies a de- 
claration of war on our part ; — this point, it fays, it is treafon in any 
body to difprow. — It adds, that this war would be expedient, be- 
caufc " we can bring Great-Britain to our feet. We can ruin her 
manufaflurers ; we can ftarve her colonies ; we can take Canada 
and Nova-Scotia : while the injur}-^ will be trifling to ourfelves, as 
we can fupply ourfelves as plentifully with foreign goods hy prizes 
we fliall take, as we are now fupplied by commerce ; and our pro- 
duce will meet as ready a fale in war as in peace." 

But any attempt to difprove thefe propofitions, cfpecially if made 
with trulk and ability, it declares to be the high offence of treafon, 
inafmuch as it tends to prove the opinions o{ great men erroneous, 
and to difcourage the people from undertaking a war, which tliofe 
great men have rcfolvcd to wage. 

Braving all the dangers to which thofe writers are expofed, who 
venture to give light to the people, on this moft intercfting fubjcft, 
and defpifuig the threats of profecution for treafon, I fhall attempt 
to develope the principles, to trace the hiftory, and to expofe the 
faCls in relation to our alledged caufe of complaint againft Eng- 
land ; — to examine our oivn conduft, and the allegation fo often 
made, that the attack on our National flag, was wholly without 
provocation ; and laftly, to confider the expediency of war, in 
which will be involved, its objefts — the profpeft of fuccefs or de- 
feat ; our refources, and means of annoyance of our propofed ene- 
my ; and the power, fituation, and intcrefts of the nation with 
whom we are about to contend ; and I fliall conclude with confid- 
ering the effefts of fuch a war, whether it prove fucccfsful or dif- 
graceful upon our general politicks, interior and exterior, and upon 
thofe great and permanent intereils, which ought never to be over- 
looked when we are weighing minor qucllions, or debating upon 
injuries and incidents which do not affed, or compromife our wel- 
fare or cxillence. 

It will not be denied, that on the 2M\ day of June lalt, when 
tlic attack was made on the Chefapeake, the relations between 



Great-Britain and the United States, were thofe of peace and 
amity. — This is proved by the declarations of the Prefident to 
Congrcfs, and the communications of our Miniftcrs at the Court of 
Great-Britain, which were laid before that honourable body.* It 
is farther proved by the language of the Britifli Minifters in and out 
of Parliament, and by the circumftance of our Minifters extraordi- 
nary having figned a Treaty of Amity, which fettled all our differ- 
ences, except the finglc one, of the right of fearch of merchant 
fhips for Britifli feamen, and on which point, it is faid from good 
authority, Great-Britain was ready and offered to yield the right 
of fearch except as it rcfpeftcd the narrow feas, or that portion 
of the fea which immediately furrounds Great-Britain, and where 
the danger of the lofs of their feamen, who are their only defence, 
was peculiarly imminent. 

It cannot be doubted, therefore, that peace, fo much to be de- 
fired by this country, would not have been interrupted, and that 
our profitable neutrality would have been continued, had it not 
been for the affair of the Chefapeake, which cannot be too much 
deplored. The queftion, therefore, is limited to the examination 
of the caufes of that unfortunate aft, and of the confequences which 
ought to rcfult from it. 

As a great portion of the irritation which has been produced, 
excited, and encouraged, has proceeded from an ignorance of the 
faCls which preceded and accompanied that affair, it will be ufeful, 
before we enter into an inveftigation of the Law of Nations upoa 
this fubjeft, to fettle, as far as poifible, thefe/«5j. 

In the fummer of 1 806, a French fquadron of line of battle 
fliips and frigates having met with a gale upon our coafts, a part of 
them took refuge in the Chefapeake, to fhelter themfelves from their 
enemies. This rendered it neceffary for Great-Britain to detach a 
fquadron to watch the motion of their enemies, and they accord- 
ingly, as they lawfully might, took their ftation in Hampton 
Roads. By the Law of Nations, and the principles of an impar- 
tial neutrality, we owed to both thefe fquadrons, equal proteftion. 
While we permitted the French to repair and relit their fhips, re- 

' See the Prefident's Communications to Congrefs, on this fubje(5t 
B 



10 

claim their defcrters, nnd to prepare to encounter their enemies, the 
laws of hofpitality equally demanded, that we fhould allow equal 
privileges and indulgence to the Britifli fquadron, and more cfpc- 
cially that \vc fhould not countenance or encourage any meafures 
by which their means of encountering their enemy fliould be, wliile 
they wore under our proteftion, weakened. 

*0n the 7th day of March lall, five Brit'ijlo feamen belonging to 
the Britidi floop of war Halifax, Lord James Townfhcnd command- 
er, while employed in weighing the anchor, rofe upon their ofiicer, 
threatened to murder him, and made off with the boat to the Amer- 
ican fliorc, where they landed. Their names were, Richard Hu- 
bert, fail-maker, born in Liverpool ; Henry Saunders, yeoman of 
the flieets, born in Greenock ; Jenkin Ratford, born in London ; 
George North, captain of the main-top, born in Kinfale ; and 
William Hill, boni in Philadelphia ; who entered in a Britifh port 
voluntarily, viz. in Antigua. 

The faAs of their birth and citizcnfhip were taken from the fhip'a 
books, and were fvvorn to have been their vivn declarations at the 
time of their entry on board the fhip. 

The nature of this evidence is conclufive, and its fainiefs \sfiron^ly 
marked by their not attempting to conceal tlie facl, that one of tlve 
five was born in Philadelphia. 

The very day after their landing, they were enlifled as part of 
the crew of the United States fliip Chefapeakc. Perhaps this was 
done ignorantly, though it is worthy of remark, that an Englifla- 
man, and cfpecially a Scotchman and Irifliman, may be almnjl as 
r.Wi/y difcerned from an Amcncan, by thofe who are converfant 
with failors, as a black man can be diflinguiflied from a white one. 
It is certain, however, that thcfe men could not have been pofTefTed 
of American proteftions. The very day after the enhflmcnt. Lord 
James Townfhend demanded thefe men of Lieutenant Sinclair, the 
recruiting officer of the Chefapeakc. The government of the 
United States had, as Captain Barron afTcrts, ordered the recruiting 
officers not to enl'i/l Brit'ifi defericrs. Thefe defcrters were not at 

* Fi)r thcfe fadls, foe the afl'idavlts of tlic conun;mdiT ;iiul otliccis of the 
ILilifax, priiitetl in the Trial of Jciikin Ratforii, one of tlic niutiuccr., and re- 
printed at Bofton. 



11 

this time on board the (lup, but at the rendezvous. It naturally oc- 
curs to aflc, why did not Lieutenant Sinclair, in obedience to the 
orders of the government, immediately difcharge thefe men ? If he 
had enhfted them ignorantly, the fp'trltt nay, the letter of his orderij, 
obliged him to difcharge them as foon as he knew from the higheft 
authority, their commanding officer, that they were deferters from hio 
fllip. Many honeft well meaning men have contended, that the 
word of a publlck officer ought to be refpc£led. 

This is an excellent general principle, and the obfervance of it 
would tend very much to preferve the peace of nations ; but we 
fhould not forget that this rule has a double application. It op- 
erates as much in favour of the officers of other nations as of our 
own. When, therefore, Lord James Townfhend pledged his word 
to Lieutenant Sinclau-, that the men whom he had enlifted, contrary 
to the orders of our government, were his failors, and that the 
Britifli government had a property in their fervices, it was as much 
the duty of Lieutenant Sinclair to give full faith to the word of 
Captain Townfliend, as it was the duty of Captain Humphreys to 
give credit to the declaration of Captain Barron : — it was ftill 
ftronger ; — Lieutenant Sinclair did not, could not know that the 
declaration of Lord Townfhend was untrue ; but Captain Hum- 
phreys did know that the declaration of Commodore Barron wa« 
unfounded, and he turned out to be right in the faft. 

Lieutenant Sinclair made an evafive anfwer to the application of 
Captain Townfhend, and did not deliver or difcharge the men. An 
application was then made to Captain Decatur, who referred him 
back to Sinclair. The Britifh Conful applied to the Mayor of 
Norfolk for thefe men, but without efFeft — and laftly, the Britifli 
Minifler applied to our government, who replied, that they had on 
a former occafion ftated their rcafons for not complying with their 
requefl, and that moreover the men were Americans. 

Thefe men, who, with the exception of Hill, were all native Brli- 
IJh feamen, and had no claims from refidence or other caufes on our 
protection, were all continued on board the Chefapeake, while at 
Wafhington, under the eye of our government. No meafures ap- 
pear to have been taken to afcertain their claims to our proteftion. 
No evidence down to this day has ever been publifhed in relation to 



1'2 \ 

either of thefe men. We muft conclude, therefore, that they arc, ai 
the Britifli have proved under oatli,^// native Britifli feamen, except 
WtU'iam Hill. It cannot be pretended tliat the government are iu 
pofll'flion of evidence in reJpeEl to them which it does not think it im- 
portant to pubhfli, becaufe we know that they have been at great 
pains to coUedl and pubHfh the evidence witli refpeft to three other 
feamen, whofe cafe has no connexion with the caufc of the attack ' 
on the Chefapeake. I 

Thefe feamen were among the crew of the Chefapeake at the pe- 
riod of the faid four feveral, folemn demands, and continued on 
board till the fliip failed down the river, when four of them deferted- 
The fifth, Jenkin Ratford, remained on board till after the laft de- 
mand made by Captain Humphreys, and to which demand Captain 
Barron replied, that " he knenv of no fiich men as Captain Hum- 
phreys defcribed." After the aftion, Ratford was found hid in 
the coal hole of the Chefapeake, and has fince been tried, found 
guilty of mutiny, and executed. He confefled himfelf to be a na- 
tive of London, that he had entered his Britannick Majefty's fer- 
vicc voluntarily ; that he was pcrfuaded to enter on board the 
Chefapeake, in order to proteft himfelf from the fearch of his ofli- 
cers, and that on his entering, he was aflced if he had not a fecond 
name ; that he thereupon entered by the name of Wilfon. As foon 
as thefe repeated demands and rcfufals were known to the com- 
mander in chief, Admiral Berkeley, finding, as he alledges, that the 
feamen of the Britifh fleet were deferting every day, he iflued the 
order referred to in the note below,* in fubftance direfting the offi- 
cers of his Majefty's fliips under his command, to require permif- 
fion of the Captain of the Chefapeake to fearch that (hip, on the 
high fcas, for the deferters referred to in faid order, and to proceed 
and fearch for the fame, at the fame time offering a like and recip- 
rocal permiflion to the American officers. Captain Humphreys, of 
the Leopard, was entrufted with the execution of this order, and 
the manner in which he executed it, is too well known to need rcp- 
v=>tition. Two or three remarks, however, may not be amifs, as an 
opportunity will not again occur in the courfe of the propofed dif- 

* See Admiral Berkeley's order, prixitcd in tlic Trial of Jenkin Ratford. 



13 

cufllon : — 1ft, That another formal demand was made oi their own 
feamen, by the Britifli officers, before the laft; alternative was re- 
forted to ; that this demand was couched in terms fo polite and 
refpedlful, that it would not have been beneath the dignity of Cap- 
tain Barron to have met it with equal politenefs, and to have ftated 
the cafe truly to Captain Humphreys, that three of the men de- 
manded had efcaped, and that the fourth he was ready to dehver ; 
this would probably have finifhed this unhappy affair. 2d, That 
nothing in the anfwer of Captain Barron, is a fufficient excufe for 
his not delivering up Jenkin Ratford, one of the mutineers, thea 
en board the Chefapeake. 

The reafon affigncd to the Britifh officer, that he was ordered 
not to fuffer his crew to be muftered, by any but his own officers, 
does not apply — There was no neceffity of mvjler'tng them at all. 
At that time it was well known, it mujl have been knoivn on board 
the Chefapeake, who the men demanded were. And he declares 
that he had pofitive orders from the Government not to enlift 
deferters, which amounted to an order to deliver them, if he had 
enlifted them ignorantly. 

He might therefore have obeyed both thefe orders of the Govern- 
ment, and have prefcrved the honour of our flag ; and what is more, 
the honour, faith, and reputation of our officers. By fending on 
board the Britifli fliip, Jenkin Ratford, of London, a mutineer, and 
deferter, and accompanying it with a declaration on his honour, 
that the others had deferted from the Chefapeake, he would have 
fatisfied Capt. Humphreys, would have fubftantially obeyed the 
order of our Government not to enlifl; deferters, and have prevent- 
ed the unhappy cataftrophe. 

3dly. The meannefs of many of our publick papers and refolu- 
tions, in reprefenting this attack as cowardly, and affaffin-like, can- 
not be too much condemned by every candid and ingenuous mind. 

The Leopard was a 50 gun fhip, and carried a fmaller number 
of men than the Chefapeake ; the Chefapeake was a large 44, 
which our officers have often declared equal to a Britifli 64;. So 
far from the Britifli officers knowing, that the Chefapeake was un- 
prepared, it turns out by the charges of our own officers againfl. 
Barron, that flic was fully prepared. Indeed the Britifli officers 



u 

are faid to have avowed to ours, before (he failed, that they were 
inftrii6led to obtain thefe men by force if they were not given 
up. Our own officer after having refolvcd to defend his fhip, 
ought to have nailed his flag to the maft, and to have funk his 
adverfaiy, or to have gone down himfelf with his flag undiflion- 
ourcd. It is the difgracc which this conduA fecms to fix 
upon us, which makes us feel fo pungently. 

Had Capt. Barron vindicated our national honour as he ought 
to have done, we fliould have fcen this affair in a very different 
light. We fhould have acknowledged that we were wrong in the 
principle of en/1/ling their feameny but we might have added, that no 
nation fhall infult our flag with impunity : we need not indeed 
have fa'td this ; the fail would fpcak a plainer language. 

After the colours of the United States (hip had been ftruck, 
the Britifli officers proceeded to fearch for their deferters. 

The rcfult of this fearch was this : — they found Jenkin Rat- 
ford, one of the feamen demanded — and John Strachan, Daniel 
Martin, and William Ware, three other deferters, whom they did 
not fufpeft had been enlifted ; who were not contained in the or- 
der of Admiral Berkeley, but who are admitted by our Govern' 
merit to have been deferters from the Britifh frigate Melampus. 
Thefe men were no more the caufe of the attack, than if the 
Britifh had found an anchor on board, which had hccn Jlo/en from 
their fliip, but which they could never expeS to find on board one 
of our publick fhips. They alfo found twelve other Britifli fea- 
men, who not being deferters, they fuffered to remain. It 
turned out therefore, that there were on board the Chcfapeakc, 
A\hcn file was at Wafliington, five Britifli deferters from the Hali- 
fax, three deferters from the Melampus, and twelve other Britifli 
fcamen. 

The Britifli officers took away the fmgle feaman whom they 
found of thofe demanded, and the three other deferters from the 
Melampus, whom they were not ordered to take, bccaufe they were 
not known to have been on board. 

The afloniflimcnt and indignation of every American was excited 
foon after, by the Prcfident's declaration, " that the feamcn de- 
manded had been previoufly afccrtained to be native citizens of the 



ir> 

United States." — That the Britilh Admiral fliould have the hardi- 
hood to dtmatiff, and to order the retaking by force, native citizens 
of America, was fo incredible in itfelf, that fome writers ventured 
to doubt it. This drew out the evidence on both fides, and it 
turns out mojl unequivocally, that the Prefident was grofsly »////«- 
formed. No doubt tiie*"- high officers mull rely upon the veracity 
and accuracy of inferior agents. — Unhappily the fource of the 
Prefident's information was impure ; and a publick, folemn, nation- 
al declaration, by the negligence or falfehood of fome fubaltern offi- 
cer, turns out to be unfiipported by fads. 

The cafe was this : — The Proclamation ftates, that the aft of 
the Britifli officers was fo much the more unpardonable, " as it 
had been previoufly afcertained that the feamen demamleel, were 
native citizens of the United States." 

The e/fence of the criminality confifted in demanding native citi- 
zens of the United States, and in attacking a fhip of war for not 
delivering fuch citizens. Now it turns out that all the feamen de- 
maiided, were native Briti/Jj feamen, and therefore, all this exagger- 
ate d point of criminality falls to the ground. 

When the publick called upon the Government for the evidence 
of the citizenfhip of thefe deferters, the Prefident, it is prefumed, 
called on the inferior officers, on whose report he had made the 
declaration ; and they, in order to cover their errors, inftead of fur- 
nifhing the evidence of the citizenfhip of the deferters from the 
Hahfax, who were demanded, gave the documents in relation to the 
deferters from the Melampus, who were not demanded, but who 
being found among the crew of the Chefapeake, were taken out. 
Thefe documents were publiflied and applied to fupport the pro- 
clamation, and to prove that the Britifli officers made an attack 
for the recovery of native Americans. This is now known to be 
falfe. For an expHcation of this point, fee the notes.* 

* Seamen who deferted from the Halifax, Lord James Townfliend, and who 

were fo often demanded, and for whom the attack on the Chefapeake was made, 

•viz. Richard Hubert, of Liverpool,"] demanded, but efcaped from the Chefa- 

Henry Saunders, of Greenock, | do. do. [peake. 

Jenkin Ratford, of London, !> demanded and taken. 

George North, of Kinfale, I demanded, but efcaped from the Chefa- 

William Hill, of Philadelphia, J do. do. [peake. 

\See the conii/iuaticn of thh iioti in thi n:xt fage?- 



\Cy 

In fnA no evidence has yet been, and no evidence ever can be 
adduced to prove that the feamen demanded^ and whofe proteftion 
by us was the fole caufe of attack, were Americans ; becaufe they 
wore and have been proved by tho highcil evidence to be native 
Brilifh fiiimcn. 

But iiiici- tlic cafe of the men taken from the Melampus, has 
been blended with that of the others, let us fee how the facts turn 
out as to them. 

Inllead of fupporting the proclamation, as to the faft of their 
having been nfcertatned to be native citizens, it turns out, that Capt. 
Barron had fimply taken the Jlory of the culprits : It turns out 
further, that one of them was born at Bonaire, in Spanlfli Amer- 
ica, and was not even a citizen of the United States ; that the two 
others were black men, born flaves in Maryland, and ftriAly there- 
fnrvj^ mt nativp /■// /■x/'w r, though natives. That they a// told Capt. 
Barron a falfehood, in Hating that they had been impreffcd on 
board the Melampus, becaufe they referred to their former mailer, 
Capt. Crafts, who dates, that he fufpefted and charged them with 
theft in England, that they therefore abfconded, and in order to 
protcft themfelves, entered on board the Melampus voluntarily. 
Capt. Crafts, pleafed, probably, with getting rid of fuch rafcals, 
never demanded them either of the Captain of the Melampus, or of 
the Britiih Government, after they were enlifted, and they remain- 
ed on board that frigate till they again deferted from her in our 
country. 

Some honed men doubt, whether the Britidi officers had a right 
to enlift thefe men ; and if they had, whether they could reclaim 
them from us, after dcfertion. 

Protelling that it has no connexion with the affair of the Chefa- 
peake, they not being the nun demanded, I would obfene, that it is 
not competent for our Government to deny the right of our citi- 
zens to enter into foreign fervice, in a foreign jurifdiction, becaufe 
111. The prefent adminiftration and all the party now in power in 



Seamen deferted from the Melampus, 

John Strachan, of Maryland, T not demanded, but taken. 
William Ware, of Maryland, V do. do. 

Dauicl Martin, of Bonaire, 3 '^^- ^^^ 



17 

the United States, oppofcd the plan of the WaHiington auminiftra- 
tion to prohibit fuch conduft, and they contended that a citizen in 
time of peace, might expatiate himfelf at pleafure. The famous 
example of Commodore Barney muft be in every one's recolloftion. 

2dly. The A61 of Congrcfs prohibiting our citizens from enter- 
ing into foreign fervice within our oiun terr'itoryy is a ftrong, and al- 
mofl irrefiftible implication that they may do it in other countries. 

3dly. The late anfvver of our Government to the Britifli Min- 
ifler, that we cannot ftop to enquire of what country a man is a 
fubjeft, when he offers himfelf to enhft as a foldier or failor, is a 
perfect anfvver to us upon that fubjeft. And our pradlice from the 
commencement of our Government to this day, of inviting, and 
naturalizing the citizens of a// countries, even of nations at war, 
ought to make us perfectly filent on this topick. 

-Ithly. If a man has a right to enlift in a foreign country, and 
does fo enlift, figns the articles of war, receives the bounty and 
wages, he becomes to all intents and purpofes a fubjeft of his 
newly adopted country, and all our claims over him, and his to our 
proteftion abfolutely ceafe. To illuftrate this cafe, let us fuppofe 
that Capt. Barney had delivered up the frigate which he command- 
ed, to the Britifh in the Chefapeake, and had landed, and the 
French Government had demanded the delivery of him for the 
purpofe of punifhment, and had threatened us with war, in cafe of 
refufal, is there any doubt that we fliould have delivered him up ? 
And fhould we not be juftly deemed accomplices of his crime, if 
we fhould refufe ? 

Now the cafe of thefe two blach men, is precifely the fame with 
that of Capt. Barney. — Mr. JefFerfon calls thern cit izens of t he 
IJnitedStates ; if fo, their right of expatriation is as great as that of 
Capt. Barney, or of Mr. JefFerfon ; and when once legally entered 
into foreign fervice, if they defert, they are as much reclaimable as 
either ot the. othe rs would be. 

I have briefly confidered the cafe of thefe men belonging to the 
Melampus, becaufe fome people have or pretend to have, fcruples 
on this fubjeft ; but I repeat, that the cafe of thefe men forms no 
part of the real queftion. 
C 



18 

It will conilitutc i.u part of the dilcufllou between the two 
countries ; it does not affeft the merit or demerit of Admiral 
Berkeley : He ordered his officers to take Richard Hubert, Jen- 
kin Ratford, and George Nortli, thefe were all native Englishmen. 
His officers could find but one of thofe men, but they found three 1 
others, whom they had no orders to take, but who were deferters. 
If they were millakcn in thefe three laft men, (luh'tch they ivere 
not) and had no right to take them, it does not render the order 
for taking tlie real Engliflimen, and the aftual execution of it by 
fcizing one of them lefs correR. My brother farmers, will under- 
fland this better, if I put a cafe jujl Hie it. — A Sheriff has a war- 
rant to fearch a neighbour's barn for two ftolen horfes, fufpeAed 
to be concealed there : He enters, and finds one of the Jlolen horfes, 
and he alfo takes a cow, which he thinks was ftolen from another 
neighbour. Suppofe it ftiould turn out that he fhould be wrong 
as to the cow ; does it render the warrant for the horfe illegal, 
when he really foiuid one of the ftolen horfes concealed there ? 

Thus, then I have confidered, and ftated all the fads as yet 
afcertained, as to the caufe of this attack ; and it appears, that four 
trat'tve Britlfh feamen and deferters, who deferted in our territor}', 
were contrary to orders enlifted and entered in our ftiip Chcfapeake ; 
that they were demanded of the inferiour officers, and lailly of the 
Government, and were not delivered ; — that a forcible attack was 
made to recover thefe men ; and though three of thorn had efcaped, 
one was aftually found concealed on board of our fhip ; and that 
twenty Br'it'ijh failors were found to have been entered on board of 
her. 

I fliall now proceed to examine the principles of the Law of 
Nations on this subject, and whether we were in good faith obliged 
to deliver up thefe deferters ? 

The firft qucftion which prefents itfelf on this point is, how far 
the fubjefts of a nation in time of war, have a right to expatriate 
themfelves, or to enlift in foreign fervice, even in ordinary cafes, 
where they have not entered into fpecial engagements with their 
Sovereign ? — On this point all the writers on the Law of Nations, 
moft of whom are on the fide of freedom, and the privileges of the 
citizen, agree, that fubjefts not in publick employ, cannot expa- 



19 



^^ 



triate themfclves while their nation is al 'war. Burlamaqui, Vattel, 
Grotius, and Puflendorf, all hold the fame opinions, but as it would 
exceed the limits of this effay, to quote the opinions of all of them 
at large, I fliall confine myfelf to thofc of Grotius, a Dutch writer, 
whofe excellent trcatife on the rights of War and Peace, has been 
confidered a !landard work upon this fubjeft. 

In the XXIVlh fcftion of his Vth chapter, he lays it down as a 
general principle, that the fubjedls of any nation may change their 
country at pleafure, to which general rule, he makes the following 
exceptions : — " And yet herein alfo, wc are to fubmit to natural 
equity, that it fliould not be lawful when the publick was damnified 
by it. — For as Proculus obferves, always not that which is 
profitable to fome one of the fociety is ufually to be obferved, but 
what is expedient for the whole. 

" But it is expedient for the whole, that in cafe any great debt 
be contra6led, no citizen fliould forfake the city, until he have 
firft paid his proportion of it. Alfo, if upon confidence of the number 
of their citizens, they have begun a ivar, but efpecially if they are 
in danger to be beftegedj no citizen ought to forfake it, till he have 
firll provided a perfon as able as himfelf to defend the Common- 
wealth." 

In this point all the writers on the Law of Nations, are agreed, 
and if they had been filent, the dictates of common fenfe and natur- 
al equity, and the firft principles of the focial compadl, would have 
decided the queftion. 

In the cafe of Great-Britain, all the reafoning of Grotius, applies 
to the conteft in which flie is now engaged. 

It will not be denied that flie has undertaken this war " in con- 
fidence of the number, and abihty of her fubjeds ;" nor will it be 
queftioned, " that flie is not only in danger, but is aftually threat- 
ened with being heficged''^ by the mofl formidable power which the 
world has ever feen. We cannot therefore, refift the conclufion 
of Grotius, that no private citizen of Great-Britain has a right to 
forfake his country, without providing a perfon equally able to de- 
fend the Commonwealth. 

If this dodlrine is true with refpeft to private citizens, who are 
only bound by a tacit and implied contract, how much ftronger is 



20 

the principle when apphed to pcrfons in publick employ, bound by 
an dsprefs agrec-nicnt, obliged by their having received the publick 
money for their fervices, and on whofe fidelity the cxiftence of the 
nation more immediately depends ? 

All civilized nations have united in confidering defertion from 
publick fcrvice, one of the moil heinous offences. 

In America, France, and Great-Britain, it has been often punifh- 
ed with death. 

If it be therefore the higheft crime, and one of the greateft inju- 
ries which a fubjeft can do to his country to defert its fervice, can 
it be neceflary to prove that it is unlawful for a friendly nation to 
receive, encourage, enlift, and defend by force fuch deferters ? 

In fupport of tlie mouftrous opinion, that it is not unlawful, 
fome people have remarked, that by the modern ufages of nations, 
criminals who have committed offences le/s than 7nurder and forgery, 
are by the courtefy of fuch nations, not demanded when they efcape 
out of their own country into a foreign one. 

But let me af]<, why are murderers and forgers excepted from 
the general rule ? Is it not alledged to be, becaufe juftice requires 
that fuch heinous criminals fhould not efcape punifhment ? Becaufe 
the peace of the nation, whofe laws have been violated, requires 
that an example fhould be made of fuch great offenders ? 

And fuppofe that it fhould be more important to a nation to re- 
quire the delivery of her military deferters, than of the criminals 
abovcmcntioned, would flic not have a right to require them ? 

On the qucftions of the Colonial trade and of the impreffment 
of feamcn from our merchant fliips, our Secretary of State founds 
his chief argument upon the filence of the writers of the Laws of 
Nations on thofe fubjefts. And cannot the argument be retorted 
with equal force on this point ? Not a didlum can be produced from 
any writer to prove that neutral or friendly nations have a right to 
protcA the deferters from the fervice of belligerents. And yet all 
thefe writers difcufs the queftion how far nations can harbour the 
criminals who efcape from other nations ; and if any fuch right as 
the one for which fome Americans contend, was conceived to 
cxifl, is it pofTible that fome one of thefe luuncrous writers would 
not have mentioned il ? 



21 

In fadl the acknowledged ufage of all civilized neutral nations, 
in reftoring fuch dcfertcrs from the armies or (hips of nations at 
war, the abfolute neccflity of fuch an ufage to the exiftence of 
nations, perfeAly account for this filence. A faft which took 
place the laft year, in our own country, proves that tlic French 
officers view it in this hghi. Admiral Willaumez met with an 
American brig at fca ; he found in her four dcferters, who had 
efcaped from the Valcurcufe frigate. Not content with taking 
them out, he writes a letter* in a moft indignant ftrain, to his Minider 
at our Court, and dcfires him to demand fatisfaftion for this m'ljcon- 
du8 ; — not for the mifconduft of one of our publick officers, ia 
enlifting his men, and refufing to deliver them when demanded, but 
for the mifcondudl of a private citizen, in daring to employ men, 
who had been once in the fervice of his Imperial Majejly. This 
cafe, though an extravagant one, and partaking of the charafter of 
French domination, is ftrong evidence of the general underftanding 
of military men, that " deferters from publick fervice cannot be 
harboured." 

Such feems to have been the impreffion of our own Government, 



' "To Gen. Turreao, French AmbalTador at Wafliington. 

" MY LORD, 

" You have learnt by the arrival of fome of my fcattered fliips in America, 
the unfortunate event by which they were feparated from me." [Here Admi- 
ral Willaumez gives the detail of the tempeft.] That at this date the Foud- 
royant was nearly new mailed, and proceeds to enforce to General Turrreau, 
how neceflary it was that the lliips which had put into the American ports in 
diftrefs, fliould haften to join him at the Havana, where his fquadron if collect- 
ed and united to the Spanilli force at that place, would in effedt oppofe a 
flrong fquadron, and double to that of the Englifli, who at Jamaica, have only- 
two line of battle fliips. Admiral Willameuz further fays, that he purpofed 
going to Vera Cruz, agreeably to the projedt of the government of the Spanifli 
colony of Havana, to bring fome miUions of dollars, which he ftates will bo 
more apropos, as the French Emperor had a right to the payment of one mill- 
ion of dollars of which the fcarcity was very great at the ifland of Cuba. Ad- 
miral Willaumez then continues, " I have jufl apprehended four feamen, dcfert- 
ers from tlie Valcureufe frigate, which I found on board an American brig, 
where they had engaged at feventcen dollars per moiuh. Now, fir, if you can 
fucceed in making the American government pay down a compenfation for 
this mifconducfl, in feducing thus our feamen, you will punifli it by making it 
I'mart in that point in which it feels moft, viz. its avarice in money, and with 
fo much the more jufticc, thofe people (meaning the American merchants) have 
for three years part been continually injuring our marine by feducing our beft 
feamen from us. (Signed) 

Le C. Ad. P. WILLAUMEZ, 
On board the Foudroyant, Havana, 25th OiSober, 1806." 



22 

:iiid its orders on this fubjeA are conclufive as againll ourfelvcs. It 
diredcd its officers not to enliil defertcrs from the Br'iUJh jh'tps ; — if 
this order had been iffued and executed in good faith, we fliould have 
been fully acquitted, even if dcferters had been unintentionally en- 
tered and found on board, and the whole weight of unprovoked hof- 
//7//J', with which Great-Britain has been charged, would have reli- 
ed upon her officers. — But unhappily for us, after admitting the 
Law of Nations to be as we have ftated, by ifluing the abovemen- 
tioncd order, our fubfequentconduft evinces cither a want of fincer- 
ity in ifluing that order^ or a fubfcquent change in the policy which 
dilated it. If it had been made with good faith, why was not a 
regular fornnal enquiry made upon Mr. Erflvine's demand ? Why 
were not the Britifli officers invited to point out the men, and ex- 
hibit the evidence of their claim to them ? Was not the demand of 
a publick. Miniller fufficiently folemn, and did it not require fome 
notice and rcfpeft ? Could it be imagined that our officers could 
know tlie deferters by intuition ? or was it prejumed \\\2X. theyjincw 
them to be on board, tn d'treB breach of the orders aforefaid, not 
to enliil them ? 

Will it be contended, that they were ignorant who they were, 
and that they relied upon the culprits coming forth of their own 
accord, out of a crew of 400 men, and faying " Ecce homines, we 
dcferve a halter ?" 

It is apparent to every fair and candid man, that if the order 
was iffijed in good faith, when the Britifh officers gave notice that 
five of their feamen were enlifted, there was but one plain, upright 
courfe — to adc the Britifli officers to point out the men. 

But would you deliver up men upon the mere declaration of 
Britifli officers ? ! ! — Do not be alarmed, I would not ; — but I 
would inft^itute an official, enquiry, in wliich the Britifli officers as 
profecutors, fliould be permitted to exhibit their pioofs of their 
claim to the men charged ; and the allcdged dcferters fliould have 
ample time, and the aid of Government to fubllanliate their claims 
to our proteftion. 

This was the courfe of nature, of truth, of good faith, of national 
juRice. It was the way to avoid mifunderflanding, to fave the 
lives of our citizens, which have been deftroyed in confcquencc of 



23 

the ncgleft of this courfc, to avoid IVar, with which wc are threat- 
ened. 

There is nothing in this procedure derogatory to our national 
honour. It was referving the jurifdiAion and trial of the qiicflion 
to ourfilves. It would have given perfeft fatisfaflion to all par- 
ties, and would have heightened the confidence of all nations in our 
good faith. 

It was pecuharly proper in this cafe, becaufc the alledged defer- 
tion had taken place in our own territory, while the fhips of a 
friendly power were under our proteftion. We were therefore 
bound to know, or at leaft to enquire into the fafts, and to render 
juftice. A refpe8 to our territorial rights, alone prevented the Brit- 
iHi from retaking their criminals by frefli purfuit. A refpe£l to 
ourfelves, and to the obligations of an impartial neutrahty, required 
that we {hould render them that jujl'ice which their refpeB for us pre- 
vented them from doing for themfelves. 

But why was not this natural and fair courfe of procedure adopt- 
ed ? The hiftory of the cafe gives the anfwer. Upon fuch an in- 
veftigation and enquiry, the deferters from the Halifax would have 
all turned out to be native Britifli fubjefts ; of courfe there could 
have been no apology for not rejlorlng them. On the other hand, 
to reftore to thofe enemies of the human race, as I have heard fome 
perfons call them (hojles humani generis) the very means by which 
they were to annoy the fleet of our illuftrious friend, the Emperor 
of the Weft, and this in the vcy face of his augujl reprefentaiive^ 
would have been to hazard the difpleafure of our firmeft, fafteft 
friend. In other words, deep rooted, and cultivated antipathy to 
Great-Britain, and an habitual dread, as well as fuicere partiality to 
France, forbad the adoption of any meafures, which, by conciUating 
the former, would tend to render the latter more jealous of us. 

But fome honeft, and a fetu able and refpeAable men, who gd 
along with us in our opinions to this point, who agree, that the 
praftice of enlifting Britiili deferters is extremely wrong, and a vi- 
olation of neutrality, and even in the opinion, that our own conduft 
in this affair might juftify hojlilities from the government of Great- 
Britain, ftill contend that Berkeley had no fuch right, that it be- 
longed only to his government to wage ivar. 



24. 

To this opinion two anfvvcrs may be given, both of which are 
pcrfodly fatisfaftory : — HI, That although this doftrine may be 
o-cncrally true, and it certainly very much conduces to the peace of 
nations to maintain it, yet it is an affair altogether between the 
fubahtrn officer ami his government. Surely no man will be fo mad 
as to contend, that Admiral Berkeley's having done this aft with- 
out the authority of his government, is a greater caufe of complaint, 
a greater infult, or a more iullifiablc ground of hoftility, than if 
the Britifh government had ordered it. If, therefore, that govern- 
ment, after revievnng all the conduft of that officer, and the cir- 
cumftances of provocation, fhall approve the ftcps he took, it will 
iland prccifely on the fame footing, as if Mr. Erflcine had reported 
our refufal to deliver the deferters to his government, and that gov- 
ernment had ifTued an order to re-feize the men by force. 

2dly, It is a great miftake to fay, that a fubaltern officer can in 
no cafe whatever, of his own authority, make reprifals or commit 
an aft of hoftility. It is true that military men are confidcred in 
a great meafure as machines, in the hands of their fuperiors ; they 
are bound to obey orders, and can exercife their difcretion fo far 
only as is necejfary to the execution of thofe orders. But if in the 
courfe of fuch duty, an unexpefted incident takes place, which 
goes to defeat the objeft of their orders, that fame mihtary ftrift- 
nefs requires that they fliould remove fuch obftacle if prafticable. 
An officer is fent, as was the commander of the BritiHi fleet in 
Hampton roads, to watch and prevent the efcape of an enemy — 
he lands the guns of one of his fhips to careen her. — A neutral rtiip 
of war, direftly before his eyes, lands and puts the guns on board, 
and proceeds \.o fea — will any man be fo unrcafonable as to contend, 
that the Britifli officer cannot purfue fuch fliip, demand his guns, 
and on refufal, compel by force the furrender of them ? Sliall he 
fubmit to fee the objeft of his expedition defeated, and report to 
his government that he conceived it to be more proper that the 
guns (hould be diplomatically demanded P 

But, fay fome other olijeflors, true, in extreme cafes, the law of 
felf-j)r(.fervation will juftify an inferior officer in making forcible re- 
prifals, but was the cafe of Admiral Berkeley fuch an one ? My an- 
fwer is, that everv officer fo entnillcd, niiiil iud)^e for hinifelf. He 



or. 



takes his honour and Hfe in one hand, and his fword in the other. 
If his government juftifies him, he efcapes — if Hie condemns, he falls. 
But that Admiral Berkeley had rcafon to apprehend a total do- 
ftruftion of the Britilh fquadron on our coafts, the following fafts 
feem toeftabhfli : — 1ft, It is alledgcd that dcfertion had become fo 
frequent that the Britifli fquadron had loft nearly an hundred men, 
between March and June, and great rewards had been offered at 
Halifax, by the Province^ for the apprehenfion of thefe deferters. 
2dly, Although Captain Barron gave fuch wretched protcAion to 
the deluded men who entered on board his (hip, ftill the example 
was fo contagious, that immedialely after three men deferted, landed 
near Hampton, and were fecntecl by our inhabitants. Nineteen 
Britifli feamen rofe upon a Britifh cutter, and brought her into the 
Delaware, where they landed, were protefted, and have not been 
delivered up ; on the contrary, our newfpapers congratulated " thefe 
much injured and high fp'irited mcHf" on their fuccefs. Six men ran 
away with a boat of the Columbine, at New- York — and fix more 
landed at New- York, from the Jafon, and are all concealed in our 
country : — and laftly, fixty-five failors rofe upon their officers, in 
the Jafon, with the intent of efcaping to onr friendly fijores — and 
thev would have fucceeded, had it not been for the timely and 
fpirited interference of their officers. This frigate has fmce arrived 
at Halifax, with fifty of her crew in irons, fo that her cruife againft 
her lawful enemy was defeated. Can any- one deny, after thefe ex- 
amples, that the cafe was fo extreme as to juftify an officer in re- 
forting to force, after every other means had failed ? 

But it muft not be forgotten that the true, and indeed only 
real queftion between the two nations is, whether the fadls which 
preceded the attack on the Chefapeake, amounted to fuch a provo- 
cation, that if reported to the government of Great -Britain, that 
government would have been authorized to make reprifals, or even 
to declare ivar againft us ? — Let any man confult the writers on 
the Law of Nations, or his own feelings of moral propriety, and 
decide. This is certain, that as a belligerent nation, we fliould 
1 be the lafl to fubmit to a principle, which in its operation 
would completely defeat the beft concerted military enterprifes. 
And aue fhould think that our moderation had been fufficiently 



26 

inaiufelled, if, after three fcveral inferior demands, ourpubliek miii- 
ilters liad made a. formal demand of another foverelgtiy and been re- 1 
jufed redrrfi. 

But admit, if tl k' pojjiblc, that all the reafoning we have cited is 
wrong, and th:it we have good caufe of war againft Great-Britain, 
does it follow, that war is necejfar'ily to be undeitaken ? Are there 
no cafes in which war, though juftifiable, may be avoided, without 
difhonour ? Let us liften to Grotius on that point : — " It is better 
fometimes to remit our own right, than to engage in a doubtful wa: 
for it," " efpecially if undertaken to exa8 puni/hment'^ — which i; 
precifely the cafe in this inftance. We have no principle, no inter- 
eft, no motive for war, but to exafl punjjhment in a doubtful cafe. 
Again fays Grotius, " No prudent man will adventure in fuch an 
enterprife, where good fuccefs fliall bring little profit, but when- 
the leaft mifcarriage may prove fatal." " Grant that our griev- 
ances are unjuft, and unworthy to be borne, yet it vrill not follow, 
that we ought, by ftriving againft them, to make our condition j 
luorfe." Apply it to our prefent cafe. 

If vfefucceed in the war, we gain the right to cover a few Britiflj 
deferters, whom we do not want, and which, as Grotius fays, will 
bring little profit ; but we hazard our lives, our liberties, our gov- 
ernment — we do not hazard our property ; that, together witli 
our neutral advantages, will inevitably go to enrich our enemy. Bu',. 
fome people fay, we do not go to war for Briti/h deferters — thofc 
we do not want — we arc better without them — we go to war t(> 
make Great-Britain give up the right oifearch of our Jhlps of tuar. 

This is one of thofe errors which certain artful men have pur- 
pofely interwoven with the cafe of the Chefapeake, with which ii 
has no connexion. Great-Britain docs not claim this right — Hie will 
renounce it by treaty — flie at this moment abfolutely diflaims it. 
The cafe of the Chefapeake was not grounded upon it ; it was ;i 
reprtfid for a wrong done by us ; for a wrong for which remcd) 
had boon refufod ; and it is, by the Law of Nations, the only rem- 
edy Jhort of war. 

• It is not iiTinrobable tliat Admiral Berkeley will be recalled to afcertalii 
r.ititfa(fl(irily ^vllcl^lo^ the aflair of tin.' Chefapeake is truly a juflifialilc aifl ol 
'ifjrlfal, or the afTumption of a general right to fearch pubLick (liips, wliici" 
U|K r ilu-y difclaim. 



27 

It was no more founded on the right of fearcli, than if one of 
our (hips on the high feas, in time of peace, (hould forcibly feize a 
boat belonging to a BritiHi fliip, with a lieutenant and crew on 
board, and fliould hold them in durefs after demand ; and thereupon 
the Britifli captain fliould attack and difable our (hip, and retake 
his men ; both thefe adls are equally rcprifals for previous injuries, 
and are both founded on the laws of nature and nations. 

I aflc, once more, is war ahuays to be undertaken, when it is 
juftifiable ? 

I anfwer, our own praftice proves the contrary. France captur- 
ed our fliips in violation of the treaty of 1778 — flie afterwards fet 
up the abominable doftrine of the role d^ equipage., and condemned 
millions upon it — (he afterwards decreed, that all neutral veffels, 
having one dollar's value of Britifli manufafturcs on board, fhould, 
together with their cargoes, be lawful prize ; and feveral more 
millions fell under this pretext. 

All thefe afts were violations of the law of nations — all of them 
were caufe of war — yet we did not go to war — we made a treaty, 
and inftead of her making either acknoivledgment or faiisfaHion for ei- 
ther of thefe injuries, we explicitly renounced all claims to them. 

Spain (hut the port of New-Orleans, contrary to treaty — (he did 
it with marked infolence — (he has fince marched armed men into our 
territory, feized our citizens, and lately has taken pofTelTion of fome 
of our national military ftores — ftill we have not made war upon 
Spain, though war would have been juftifiable, and though, both 
with regard to France and Spain, we had given no caufe of ojfence, 
as we have done in this cafe to Great-Britain. 

If it be aflced, how it happens that the men who were in favour 
of war with France and Spain, are oppofed to one with Great- 
Britain — I anfwer, 1ft, That the injuries of Fiance and Spain were 
unprovoked, and therefore atrocious : 2d, That thofe of Great- 
Britain have been provoked^ even by the acknowledgment of oui- 
government, who ordered its officers not to enlift deferters, which or- 
ders were openly dif obeyed — and therefore the caufe of war is doubtful : 
but laftly, Such was the local and political fituation of France and 
Spain, that they could not injure us, while they were at war with 
Great-Britain. An impafTable gulph lies between us — but we are 



'J8 

vulnerable at every pore by Great-Britain. By her immcnfe and 
gigantick naval force, (he comes in contatl with us in every fea. 
To dcftroy our commerct, would be mere fport to her marine ; and 
although the Editor of the National Intelligencer, and his patrons, 
may think the ruin of 250,000 merchants a matter of fuch perfeft 
indifTerence, that he will not fuffer it to mar a fine calculation, yet 
the people of New-England feel differently. They know that they 
arc neceffarily a commcrchil people ; they have not one million 
Haves to labour for their fupport ; they live by the fweat of tlieir 
oivn brczi's ; their fons, their kinfmen, their friends, are engaged in 
commerce ; and we farmers of the northern Hates, arc not fo fool- 
iib as to believe that you can deilroy commerce without inflicting a 
deep wound upon the interefts of agriculture. 

We are now naturally led to confider the expediency of war, in 
relation to our means of annoyance, refources, probable loffes, and 
general effedls. 

In eftimating thefe various branches of this extenfive queftion of 
expediency, I fhall not enter much into the details, but fhall Hate 
them with all polTiblc brevity, confillcnt with pcrfpicuity. 

Our means of annoyance, and refources as ftated by the advocates 
of war, are of two fpecies, diredl and indireft, military and commer- 
cial. 

Of our military refources one would think that but little need be 
faid. The jcaloufy of military force always fufficiently ftrong, has 
been flrengthened by our philofophick adminillration ; the iiecefTity 
of conforming to the falfe opinions and prejudices by which they ac- 
quired power, has obliged them to deftroy even the little mihtary 
and naval force, which their predeccffors had built up. The Prefi- 
dent has taught the people to believe, that the experience of all 
nations and of all ages, was of no avail ; that all his predeccffors in 
power, from Saul to Bonaparte, have been miftakcn in believing in 
the neceffity of force in order to maintain rrfpni ; that the fenfe of 
juftice is the linnell hold, and rnifun the mod effettual weapon to 
proteft our rights, or to avenge injuries. With this all conquering 
weapon he has marched boldly on, till he has brought us into 
the field witli a foe, who having been challenged to meet us there, 
will take the liberty to ufe his oiun weapons. 



29 

If our little band of 3000 foldiers, could be drawn off from the 
defence of a frontier of 5000 miles, and from our tottering forts, 
more dan"-crous to their defenders than their affailants, and if Mr. 
Jefferfon could by the force of reafon, pcrfuade our enemies to 
enter a fmall defile, like that of Thermopylx, perhaps even thi; 
little knot of heroes might be immortalized by vidlory. So alfo, 
if our enemies would be gracioufly pleafed to run their line of battle 
{hips aground in convenient numbers, Mr. Jefferfon 's naval force 
would be found very effeftive, or, which would be ftill more con- 
venient, and good humoured on the part of our enemies, if they 
would fend one fliip at a time, to permit Mr. Fulton to make three 
or four experiments, we could in the courfe of two years, deftroy 
the Britifh navy. 

But we have 100,000 militia, and we can by the very cheap 
procefs of an aft of Congrefs, increafe this number at pleafure. If 
the war was to be a defenfive one, like the laft, it mull be admit- 
ted, that this fpecies of force may be calculated upon. But the 
militia cannot be marched out of the United States, and we have 
no ufe for them nvithin. 

But they would volunteer their fervices to take Canada and No- 
va-Scotia. — I do not fay that this achievement is impoffible ; but I 
am furprifed, that our publick writers fliould be fo httle fparing of 
our feelings, as to recal thofe two fcenes of our misfortune. — The 
plains of Abraham, and the Ifthmus of Penobfcot, exhibit no hon- 
ourable monuments of either our power or conduft. 

But perhaps we might have better fuccefs in another attempt ; 
perhaps with the lofs of twenty thoufand men, and the expenfe of 
fifty millions of dollars, we might take, and garrifon thofe provinces, 
with the exception of the city of Quebeck ; that city we probably 
could not take.* Suppofe us then in quiet poffeffion of thefc 

* It is furprifing with what confidence men who are totally ignorant of the 
ftate of thele provinces, boaft of taking them at a flroke. Quebeck was in a 
ruinous fituation when attacked before, and yet we failed in our attempt, though 
we had two armies before it. — It has fmce, been thoroughly fortified, and i- 
now the Gibraltar of America. We have no reafon to doubt, that it would 
hold out againft the tihole French army, at leaft: as long as Dautzick. We O'l 
the other hand, are deflitutc of engineers, or military iTvill fufficicnt for fuch an 
operation. But we fliall be told, that we fliall have French officers, French flcill, 
French artillery.— And is this our c-.vfjiaikn ? Hie metus ! hcu libertas I 



30 

provinces ; of what benefit will tlicy be to us, or what injury tlie 
lofs of them to our enemy ? To her they have been a conftant 
fourcc of expcnfe. To us the one would add a mafs of population, 
hoftile to us in feelings, language, manners, religion, and attached, 
finccrely, and irrevocably fo, to the nation whofe power and afccnd- 
ancy we have the highell reafon to dread. Every Canadian is a 
Frenchman at heart ; flaves to their priefts, they can eafily be per- 
fuaded to join the imperial banner of France, whenever the Empe- 
ror lawfully authorized by the Sovereign Pontiff, fhall think proper 
to difplay it. 

Fifty thoufand Canadians, difciplincd by French veteran officers, 
after effecting a jundlion with .50,000 Louifianians, who are equally 
French in charadler and feelings, would become very uncomfortable 
neighbours to the United States. 

Nova-Scotia does not offer a more tempting prize. — A country, 
poor, miferable, producing no flaple article, populated by men, em- 
bittered againft us, by a thoufand recollections, and who, probably, 
in half a century, will not have forgotten their deep rooted preju- 
dices againfl us, and our fyflem of government. We cannot, more- 
over, retain Halifax, without a fuperior naval force. 

It will not be pretended therefore, that our cxifting military 
means, directed and apphed by our pacifick commander in chief, 
ought to infpire great confidence in fuccefs. 

But we may be told, and nve are gravely told, that wc have an I 
immenje revenue. Our overflowing treafury appears to have em- 
barraffcd our government to find means to employ it. As reafon 
is Mr. Jcfferfon's only weapon in his exifling contefts with Great- 
Britain and Spain, and as that cofts no more than Mr. Madifon's 
falary and clerk hire, he never dreamed that it was poffible that his 
reafon might perchance fail of producing its efFe6t, and that we 
fliould iiave occafion fur the ultima ratio rcgum, poiveler and halls. 

It is polTible that fome weak minds may really believe that our 
revenue is a war rcfource, and that it juHifies our holding a bullying 
language to Great-Britain. For the information of fuch men, we 
fhall flate this point briefly. Our revenue in time of peace, is 10 
millions of dollars, of which nine tenths are derived from impofls 
on merchandize. This revenue, if it could continue, is but one 



31 
••••i 

feventeenth part of that of our propofcJ enemy, anil would be 

wholly inadequate to war operations. Four jnilliony of it are 

pledged to pay the intercft of the national debt, which if we fail to 
do, not a cent •will ever be obtained by loans or othcrwife. The 

remaining fix millions, would defray the expences of a war about 
three months annually. For the remaining nine months, each year, 
we mull fcek other means, and incur a new debt. But as it is ad- 
mitted by Mr. JefFerfon's paper, that our commerce will be deftroy- 
ed, our revenue founded folely on that commerce, wxWfall 'with it. 

Two refources which our prefent rulers have rendered as unpop- 
ular as their talents would permit, muft then be reforted to — loans 
and taxes. 

Paft experience has rendered the monied intereft too wife, to ad- 
vance their money without the pledge of new taxes ; and even with 
fuch a pledge., an adminiftration which has avowed its hoftility to 
publick faith, and the individuals of which openly propofed to cheat 
the publick creditors, before they came into power, can with a very 
ill grace propofe to borrow, or expe£l to be believed, when they 
promife to pay. 

But grant that loans are obtained, and that the war is carried on 
with fpirit ; taxes muft be raifed to pay the intereft of thefe new 
loans. The odious fyftcm of excifc muft be revived, and the ad- 
miniftration muft be compelled to acknowledge by their conduft, 
the wife forefight of their predecefTors. But as an excife of double 
the former amount, would only produce as much as the former, 
owing to the diminution of confumption produced by the diftreffes 
of war, this fource of revenue will only produce 750,000 dollars 
per annum. We muft then calculate upon about 20,000,000 dol- 
lars dirc6t taxes annually, on land and JIaves. In laying this tax, 
Mr. JefFerfon wnll have occafion for all his 100,000 militia and 
volunteers ; and if we thouglit him as much of a ftatefman, as his 
friends pretend to do, we ftiould have fuppofed that this was the 
motive for raifing them. To bring this part of the happy eftefts 
of a war for Brttifh deferters, home to the bofoms of the farmers of 
Maflachufetts, this ftate's proportion of the annual war taxes to be 
levied on lands, would be about two millions of dollars per annum, 
or about fixteen times the amount of our ^reicntflate tax, and about 



32 

double that of our whole ftatc debt ; and if the war fliould laft five 
Aears, and there is no profpe(ft of a fliortcr ifTue, wc (hould have 
j)aid, if we fhould be able, 10 millions of dollars, or a fum equal to 
eighty years prefent taxes. — Nor is this the worft fide of the pic- 
tuic ; — as the New-England farmers are in the habit of paying 
what they owe, as long as they have any thing to pay with, and as 
the citizens oi fame other dates do not pay till they arc compelled, it 
would refult, that the chief burden of the war would, as before, fall 
upon us ; — heavy balances of debts would be accumulated againft 
tlie fouthern ftates, and, after the peace, we (hould have another 
a3 of Congrefs to wipe off thefc balances, as was urged with re- 
gard to thofe contracted during the revolutionary war.* 

Thus then we fee what fort of reliance we can place upon the 
A.merican army, navy, and revenue, in an ofFenfivc war againfl 
Great-Britain. 

But we are told, that we can make a predatory war upon the 
Britifh commeixe, and our adminiftration gives another proof of 
its fpirit and ability, by propofing to repofe the conduft of the 
war in the individual enterprize of its citizens. — This is prccifely 
in charafter : but even this reliance, feeble and humiliating as it is, 
will fail. — They will permit the people of Maffachufetts, to be as 
good judges of this fubjcft, as any in the United States. 

Inftead of fitting out their 700 dull failing merchantmen a? pri- 
vateers, their pad experience teaches them, that with every advan- 
tage that fyftem cannot be purfued.f Great-Britain towards the 

• Soiitli-Ciinilina is faid to he jiift collecting the tax hiifl in 179S, and wliich 
rce paid, nearly fevcn years fnicc ; and as (lie pays, I prcfume, no intcreft for 
tliis delay, it lixs hccii at our cxpenfc. — She has laved 50,000 dollars by this 
plai'., out of tlie dales wlio paid with puntftuality. 

t Tlie opinions here cxprilTed are perfectly conformable to thofe of our 
lieloved \\'a(hingt(>n in a cafe limilar but lefs ftron;^. 'I'hefe opinions may 
be fcen in a letter addrcflitl from the Executive department to Mr. Mon- 
rot, dated Sept. I'J, ITy.'i — of which the following is an extradt. 

" How prej)oflerous is that policy which recpiircs us to abandon and 
dedniy the -uery oLjefi, for the frrprvnlioii of which hoftilitics are to be 
roinmcncetl ! It may not be aniifs," he adds, " to enlarge on the confc- 
tjiiencc* of our engaging in ti>e war a<^iinft Great-Uritain. 

" I. Seeing llie has the conunand of the fea fand appear.mccs hidicatc flrong- 
ly that flie will maintain that command.) our commerce might in one year 
lie annihilated, and tlioufands of our feamen be fluit up or dying in jails 
and prifon (hips, hi addition to her fleets now in conunill'ion, jirivateer.s 
would fwarm, as foon as obje<fh fo alluring and fu available as American 
commerce fliould prefent. 



clofc of the lall war, had learned the fecrct of paralyzing this 
fpecies of hoftility. Can it then be expcftcd, that with no enemy 
on the ocean, and with double the number of (hips of war, Ihe will 
fit ftill, and permit us peaceably to rob her citizens ? Every naval 
officer, and every merchant knows, however ignorant they may be 
at Wafhington, that fifty fall failing frigates would as completely 
blockade our ports, and fecure our privateers from the power of 
doing injury, as if they were under lock and key, or hauled up a la 
Jefferfon, in the dry docks of the Potomac. 

We proceed then to confider the other branch of our means of 
annoyance, which may be called commercial warfare. — It is main- 
tained, that we can by a war bring Great-Britain to an acknowl- 
edgment of our claims ; by confifcating the debts due to her 
merchants ; by ruining her manufaAurers ; by refufing to be 
cloathed ; and by ftarving her Weft-India colonies. Although it 
would be eafy to (liew, that all thefe meafures would eventually 
produce more diftrefs to the United States than to Great -Britain, 
that in all cafes of this nature, the dependance is mutual, and that 
in fuch contefts, the poorejl ftate always fuffers the moft ; yet I 
fhall leave this point to the good feiife of my readers, and confider 
them as operating only on Great-Britain. 

Firft then, we are to carry on the war, and to diftrefs our enemy 

" If we look back to the two laft years of our revolutionary war, a 
iudcrment may be formed on this point. A ftriking^ dcfedl in her naval 
arrangements in preceding years, left our ports open for the entry of com- 
merce, for the equipment of privateers, and the introducStion of prizes. A 
diiTerent arrangement in the latter part of the war, totally changed the 
fcene. The fmall privateers were hauled up as unable to cope with arm- 
ed merchantmen, and the larger privateers were taken. Our Ihipping fell 
at the fame time a facrifice to the vigilant operations of the Britifli navy. 

" At the prefent moment (1795) her naval power is extended beyond all 
former examples ; while that of her cuem'us is at Icaft not iucrejfcJ. 

" 2dly. Our landed as well as commercial interefts would fulTer beyond all 
calculation. Agriculture above the fupply of our own wants, would be fuf- 
pended, or its produce ptiish on our hands. The value of our lands and ev- 
ery fpecies of domcftick prop.rty would fink. 

" :5dly. The fources of revenue failing, publick credit would be deftroyed, 
and multitudes of citizens involved in ruin. The luropL- at large would be 
plunged from the fummit of profperity into an abyfs of ruin, too fuddeo 
and too fevere to be patiently borne. To increafe their calamities, direct 
taxes must be levied to liipport the war ; and it would be happy for u6 
if we could comtemplate only foreign war, in which all might unite." 



S4 

by rcforting to the old difgraccful fylk-m of confifcation. if th> 
profligacy and infamy of fuch propofitions have no weight in the 
eilimation of our fellow citizens, (which I will not believe) they 
will furely liilen to the maxims of experience, a dear bought expe- 
rience, and an enlightened policy. How trifling a fum it produced 
to the nation in the lad war, every publick man knows. — Its only 
tendency was to fcreen a few fraudulent debtors, who rejoicing in 
an opportunity to defraud their homji creditors, could of courfe, 
think it no robbery to defraud the publick. Nothing came into 
the publick cheft, and even the joy of the fraudulent debtor was 
extremely Jhort liveJ. At the treaty of peace, Great-Britain, as 
muft always be the cafe, infift;ed as a fine qua non, upon the reftor- 
ation of the rights of her bona fide fubjcfts. — The courts were 
opened to the Britifh creditors, and the debtors were compelled to 
pay with accumulated intereft : — nor was this the nuorjl part of it ; 
the Virginia legiflature refufed to obey the publick authority ; it 
neglefted to open its courts ; their citizens who owed the Britifh 
merchants, availed theitifelves of this fufpenfion of right, of this 
Jlate rebellion againft the treaty, and became bankrupt. Great- 
Britain infifted on redrcfs, for this violation of the treaty, and Mr. 
.lefTorfon ratified a convention on this fubjeft, and has paid to 
Great-Britain three millions of dollars, on account of thefe fufpend- 
ed debts. 

Is our paft; experience then favourable to a repetition of this 
fyllem of iniquity ? But nations ought to be governed by more 
extenfive policy ; — mcafures ought never to be reforted to, the 
tendency of which, is to debafe the morals of the people, and to 
fink tile national charaftcr. 

If we go to ivar with Great-Britain, it will not be eternal ; — 
peace mud fooner or later arrive : our intercfts, tlie great and ef- 
fential intereils of our country, require that Europe fliould be our 
work fliup : — fo fays Mr. Jefferfon ; fo all fonfible men admit. — 
Great-Britain is the cheapeft; labourer ; her manufaftures are fuited 
to our iiabits, and our necelTities. But neither Great-Britain, nor 
any other nation with whom we may by poffibility be embroiled, will 
ever trull us, if we pafs confifcation laws, without adding to the price 
oi the good, a premium for the rifle of a fraudulent confilcation -, 



35 

and as all fuch riiks are over eftimated, we fluiU probably pay ten 
times over, for the paltry and wicked fatisfaftion of robbing her 
private citizens, who have trullcd their property to ours. 

Such were the enlightened views of Mr. Jay and Prcfidciit 
Wafhington, and few men had better opportunities of judging of 
the eifcdls of confifcation. Mr. Jay was dire<^ed, and did accord- 
ingly agree to an article, which is a permanent one, and ftill in 
force, ftipulating, " that in all future wars between us and Great- 
Britain, no confifcation of private debts (hould be made." — Can 
it then be contended, that in the only cafe in which the article was 
to operate, it becomes void ? And will it be pretended that nations 
can make no regulations to foften tlie rigors, and IcfTen the calam- 
ities of war ? 

Without fuch an article, Great-Britain never would make peace 
with any nation whom flie fupplics, witliout ftipulating for the 
payment of debts due to her citizens, and •with fuch an article in her 
hand, what could any honeft American commiflioners for making 
peace, fay to her negotiators ? The man muft be hardened indeed, 
who will contend, that we ought to exercife a power, malum in fc, 
debafing, corrupting, difgraceful, and in face of a pofitive, humane, 
and honourable ftipulation. 

But fecondly, we are to ruin the manufaBurers of Great-Britain, 
at the very profpeft of a war they were to rife in rebellion ; the 
prophecy on this fubjedl, has turned out already to be partially falfe. 

Inftead of that terror, that violent oppofition to war from the 
manufaAurers, we hear of no difturbance, and very little uneafinefs. 
The great manufadluring towns in England, have taken no fteps to 
prevent a war or to exprefs their anxiety about it ; on the con- 
trary, we learn from petfons who have arrived from England, that 
a war with us is at leajl not unpopular, and efpecially in Birming- 
ham, which is the greateft work fhop for this country. I might 
reft the argument here, for it will be admitted, that no people are 
better judges of their intereft, than the manufafturers of England ; 
and if a war would be fo ruinous to them, they certainly wduld 
not be quiet as we hionv they luere, though a war was expected. 

But I will give a very brief fummary, to rtiew that a war would 
npt be very injurious to thefe manufadurers. 



111. Their articles arc many of them of the firjl nccefiity, and 
nations at war with them, mull and will get them, in fpitc of pro- 
hibitory repjulations. Bonaparte has exerted all his power for five 
years, to Unit out their manufaflures, and yet his own army, and 
even court, are openly clothed in them. If 700,000 troops can- 
not fhut them out of France, will patriotifm without a fword, ef- 
feft it in America ? Patriotifm did not prevent hundreds of our 
countrymen from fitting out privateers and taking our own veflels ; 
many have grown rich by plunder of this fort. Patriotifm does 
not prevent the flavc trade, though the laws are fo fevercly pro- 
hibitor)-. In fliort, patnolifm cannot be calculated upon, to effeft 
that ivhicl) poiver finds it vain to attempt. 

2dly. A much fmallcr proportion of the population of the unit- 
ed kingdoms of Great-Britain and Ireland, are employed in manu- 
fafturing for us, than we have ufually thought. — Not more than 
one fixth part of the population of Great-Britain, is employed in 
any niatiufadures. Four fifths at leaft of the manufactures of all 
nations, are confumed at home. Great-Britain exports only about 
fix milhons worth annually, to America, and it is only the profits 
on this capital, which flie would lofe, which would not exceed one 
million. — She might not even lofe that ;— the capital which is now 
employed in manufafturing for us, may be withdrawn from manu- 
faAures, and employed in agriculture and commerce, and it would 
only be the difference of profit between the new employ, and the 
old, which Hie would lofe. But grant that flic fliould lofe one mil- 
lion per annum — will that materially affect the policy of a nation 
whofe leveruie is 40 millions ? Is Great-Britain to be ruined by an 
additional million ? If that be the cafe, to borrow a phrafe from a 
writer of our own, " We have only to gather up our garments and 
fall with decency." If Great-Britain be fo reduced as to be ruin- 
ed by one million more, Jbe mujl fall, and how long our rights and 
liberties, and the liberty of the feas will furvive her, I fliall endeav- 
our to fliew briefly in the conclufion of this fl<etch. 

But laflly, we are to llarve her Weft-India colonies. — It is real- 
ly afloiiifliing, that men will be fo blinded by their haired to Great- 
Britain, as to urge and appear to believe fuch abfurd notions. 
Why did they not flarve during the revolutionary war ? Nova. 



Scotia then fupplied them with little or nothing ; fhc can now 
fiipply them with nearly all they want. They do not take our 
beef and pork in peace, they are fo dainty ; and yet we talk of 
ilarving them ! But if they could fupport a war of eight years, 
wlien Nova-Scotia was a young, uncultivated country, when our 
privateers fwarmed in thefe feas, and the ocean was covered with 
the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, how much eafier will it 
be to fuftain a war, when the provifion veffels of England, can 
navigate in perfedl fafety, having no one to make thorn afraid ? 
But do we not view the other fide of the pi6lure ? Pofleffed as 
they will be of Buenos Ayres, where provifions are cheaper than 
in any part of the world, is there not danger, that a war with us 
may turn their attention to other channels of fupply, and thus 
dellroy, perhaps for ever this branch of our commerce ? 

It will be feen then, that the hope of coercing Great-Britain by 
commercial warfare, is as delufive and defperate, as by arms ; — and 
after a long, but bloodlefs war, in which we fliould be called upon 
to fuffer rather than aft, we fhould probably be obliged to aban- 
don the claims for which the war was undertaken, unlefs Great- 
Britain, from caufes totally out of our control, fliould be obliged to 
yield to the refifl:lefs power of France. 

Let us now take a brief view of the effefts of a Britifli war, up- 
on ourfelves. — Thofe, who deluded by the language of the war 
newfpapers, and efpecially Mr. JcfFerfon's, believe, that we are to 
enter into a war in which Great-Britain will be the only fufferer ; 
and that we fliall continue to profper as before, will be woefully 
deceived. Not a man who has any thing to lofe, not a labourer, 
who depends on the fweat of his brow, but will feel, and rue the 
effefts of fuch a war : — they will be almofl: equally felt, and per- 
ceived in the compting-houfes of the merchants ; the parlours of 
the rich ; and the cottage of the poor. 

The farmer will furrender his cattle to the tax gatherer ; the 
mechanick will be obliged to hang up his rufl:y tools ; and the 
children of our indullrious fifliermen, will demand their bread in 
vain. This is not the pifture of a fourth of July orator— it is 
fober reality. The National Intelligencer with the fang froid of 
a true philofopher, configns to beggary 250,000 merchants. He 



as 

admits " that commerce will be dcllroyed by a war, and in its 
fall will crufh its immediate dependents ;" but he infults the un- 
derftandings of lis New-England farmers, by infmuating that all tie 
other clalTes of focicty will cfcape its efFcfts. Who are to employ 
and give bread to the 300,000 mechanicks in our fcaport towns, 
after the merchants are beggared ? Who are to pay the banks 
when all the property of their debtors is annihilated by war ? 
When the banks flop their dividends, and lofe part of their capitals, 
what will become of the widows and oi-phans who have depofitcd 
their little modicum in thefe pubhck inflitutions ? When the fmall 
country banks fail, who will indemnify the farmers who hold their 
bills ? 

What will become of the country traders, and the farmers, who 
owe them, when the creditors of the beggared merchants call upon 
them for immediate payment ? 

It is admitted, by the advocates of war, that commerce will be 
wholly annihilated ; with that falls our revenue : — the collection 
of diredl taxes will be found fo flow, and fo unpopular, and the 
caUs on government will be fo much more prejfmg than thofe of the 
pubhck creditors, that the intercfl of the national debt will be fuf- 
pended. The party in power, have always been oppofed to this 
clafs of publick creditors, and though they have as yet paid piindu- 
al/y, and have not violated the contraft, it is only becaufe they 
have had ample means, and it was a convenient engine of power ; — 
it was a ilrong hold over their political enemies. — But create more 
preffing exigencies, and thoufands of honeft creditors will be left 
to ftarve. — This is what they formerly propofed — it would gratify 
mzny fecret wiflies. 

If a war, then, will annihilate commerce, as the National InteUi- 
genccr admits, will ruin '2,30,000 merchants, beggar all the me- 
chanicks immediately dependant on the merchants, injnrc fome, and 
produce the failure of many of the banking inllitutions — if it will 
deflroy our revenue, and oblige the government to fufpend the pay- 
ment uf the interell of the national debt — if, moreover, as a necef- 
fary confequence, it will cripple, if not bankrupt our infurance 
companies, can i\\c fdriners hope to efcape the general devaftation ? 

Are there none alive who recoiled the effedls of our revolution- 



39 

ary war ? Can agriculture flourini, when there are no buyers i 
When all the other orders of fociety are ruined, the taxes muft fall 
upon the land-holders — and we have fhcwn, that the revenue from 
jmpoft failing, the farmers will be called upon to defray the whole 
expenfes of the war, which will annually amount to about fixteen 
times the fum of our prefent State tax. 

Can any agricultural profits meet thefe exigencies ? When our 
children are called off from the labours of the plough, to thofe of 
war, can we fupport our famiHes,and pay the extraordinary demands 
of government ? Let thofe who view thefe as light and tolerable 
evils, be clamorous for war ; but for my part, I prefer to renounce 
the right of protecting and enlifting the fubjedls of foreign nations, 
when our own population furnifhes men fufficient for our commerce 
and our navy, to embarking in a doubtful conteft, ruinous in its ef- 
fefts, and uncertain as to its iffue. 

I have faid that the war, which we are called upon to wage, 
would be a war withoiit hope. I have endeavoured to fliew that we 
can place no reafonabie reliance on our oiun refources in an ofFenlive 
and extraneous war againft Great-Britain : but I fliall be told, that 
we may calculate upon the aid of France, Spain, Holland, and 
Ruflia. Indeed, we have been already told, that fuch an alliance 
would fecure us fuccefs.* Without entering into the impolicy of 
thus embarking in the wide field of European politicks, let us ad- 
mit that we do fo embark, and that the utmoft fuccefs crowns our 
efforts — let us fuppofe our enemy, Great-Britain, proftrate at the 
feet of the allied powers — would our fituation be ameliorated ? 
Should we be confidered as principals, or, like the other allies, as 
humble vaflals in the train of the vi£lor ? Rome too had her allies, 
but was their fituation lefs dependant than thofe of the vanquifhed ? 



* We already perceive, by the fubjoined account of the celebration of the 
late French vidtoines in Georrria, that fome of our citizens have already con- 
neAed our deflinies with thofe of France. This article is copied from the 
Palladium, of Odt. 2.—" Savannah, Sept. 12. On Saturday, the 12th inftant, a 
numerous company of republicans aflembled at the Filature, to celebrate the 
vidlories of the French nation over the allies of England — events leading to the 
peace "and profperity of thefe U. States — the Hon. Edward Telfair, Prefident, 
William Stephens, and Peter H. Morel, Efq'rs. Vice-Prefidents." — Are we neu- 
tral ? Are Ruflia and Pruflia our friends .' Is it ufual to rejoice over the de- 
ftrudbion of one's friends ? 



40 

Grant all that is affumedy that Britain is the tyrant of the ocean — 
will the man who fubjiigatcd the brave and inoffcnding Swifs, who 
annihilated the republick of Italy, to place a diadem on his own 
brow, who compelled the ftubborn Dutchman, our friend and ally,* 
to receive a mailer, after 100 years of unexampled rcfiftance 
to Dpprt-ffion — who has left not one fhred of liberty or independ- 
ence, through the vaft, populous, and powerful regions, over which 
his viAorious arms have extended, be delicately or fcrupuloufly re- 
gardful of the maritime rights of nations ? 

Having conquered the continent of Europe, he exclaimed, " all 
I want are commerce, colonies andJh'ipsJ''' Can any virtuous and high- 
minded freeman of our country believe, that in procuring the grat- 
ification of thefe wants, he will be more fcrupulous or tender of the 
rights of other nations, than he has been in attaining the vaft and 
immeafurable power which he now pofFefres ? 

It may perhaps be thought by fome, that I have been too free in 
my cenfures of the prefent adminiilration, that I have intimated 
that they have rather courted, tlian fought to avoid, the prefent 
ftate of mifundcrftanding between us and Great-Britain. I con- 
fefs that if fuch Ihould be the inference, it would not be an unfair 
one. I have always been apprehenfive, that the marked partiality 
or dread of France, and the deep-rooted hollility to Great-Britain, 
which they have invariably difcovered, would lead to unpleafant 
confequences. It is well known, to all men who have noticed the 
courfe of our political hiilory, that the perfons now adminiftering 
the government of the United States, have avowed, both before 
and fince they came into power, a fettled oppofition to Great- 
Britain. 



• Hollantl lias been one of our fafteft, firnicft friends — (lie took tin early and 
an liuncfl part in favour of our liberties. Her aid was not, as the French direc- 
Uiry fay theirs was, the" fruit of a bafe fpeculatiou." The Dutch love freedom 
— leventy yearn war for the attainment of it, had endeared it to them. Who 
would have ima;,nned that imr prefent adminiflration woulil have been the fnft 
to inlult a nation, to whom we were boinid by lo many ties of pjratitude, by 
coii^jratulaiinjf their upflart tyrant tin his accellion to the throne ? Who would 
luvc thought that our republican Preluleiit would have been fo eager to ad- 
drcft liitt " di-arly beloved brother of Holland?" What would have Been 
fciid of Waihinjjton, if he /-ji/tluis put the leal to tyranny, efiiecially when 
tuvin;,' no niinifJer at that Court, 'here tould be no necellity of laying any thing 
on the lubjei'l ? .Sed lemjwra mutantur et nos muiamur cum illis ! 



41 

It is of no moment to confider the private motives which have 
led to this undue prejudice. It is fufficicnt to fay that the faft 
exifts, and is avowed and juftified in Mr. JefFcrfon's paper, the Na- 
tional Intelligencer. 

They even declare that we ought to go back to tlie events of the 

revolutionary war, to fliarpen our refentments againft Great-Britain. 

Whether thefe prejudices had any fharc in inducing the Prefidcnt 

' to fend back, the treaty, made by his oivn minifters extraordinary, 

I fhall not undertake to decide ; but I take the liberty to make 

on this topick three remarks. 

1ft, That it is a thing unexampled in the hiftoiy of nations, to 
fend back a treaty made by authorized agents, unlefs they were ei- 
ther coiTupt, exceeded their authority, or compromifed the moft ef- 
fential interefts of the State, in either of which cafes the minifters 
ought to be recalled. 

2d, That it is unreafonable to expeft in a publick treaty with 
another nation, that every article fliould be in our own favour — 
fomething muft neceflarily be given up on both fides, or a ftate of 
hoftility never could ceafe. The only queftion ought to be, wheth- 
er it was as good, as under all the circumftances of the cafe, we 
had a right to expedl ? It is believed that this treaty, on the whole, 
was fuch an one as the United States ought to have accepted. 

3d, That there was no foundation for the report, that there was 
annexed to the treaty a condition which the United States ought 
not to have acceded to. 

It may perhaps occur to fome of our readers, convinced as they 
will be of the impolicy of entering into a war with Great-Britain, 
and of the total incompetency of our means to carry on fiich a 
war, to afl<, Is it good policy to expofe the weaknefs of our coun- 
try to the world ? Does it not betray a want of patriotifm, to pub- 
lifti our opinion of our own mifconduft, and to endeavour to prove 
that we are unable to cope with a nation with whom we may pofll- 
bly be embroiled ? This is a fpecies of popular error, too common 
with many defcriptions of perfons in our country'. 

With my juftilication on this topick, I ftiall clofe this addrefs to 
my fellow-citizens. 

F 



42 



> 



111 all free govcinnieiits, publick opinion mull eventually direA 
the mod important meafures of the adminiftration. When once ex- 
prcfTod by the legal *cnnJl\tuUd authorities^ it is binding upon all the 
citizens, though it is^/7/ competent for them to ufe the prcfs, in 



• We fay, that when cxprefTec! by the conf.itutcJ aulloritiis, this publick opin- 
ion oii^ht to be treated witli tlie hi^^hift rcfpiii ; and one would iiave fuppofed, 
that in a country like ours, which boafts ot its light and information, a con- 
trary opinion ctnild not prevMl : but the National Intelligencer, in its ferious 
rcafoninjf, confiders the exprellum of the publick opinion, by the poi)ulace in 
about Itf^h'f mercantile towns as binding on <;// i/m- citizens. \n reply to fome 
rciifonings, endeavouring to fliew that war would not be juftifiable, that paper ' 
remarks, that it is unnecelVary to enter iiUo the difculVion of the jufbcc of a war, 
"the people have decided that queflJon — they have lul/UJ it, unlefs ample rep- 
aration be made." 

'J'he Chronicle holds the fame language. 

Now we undertake to lay, that the numbers and the violence difphyed on 
this occalion, were lefs than thofe which appeared in oppoGtion to the Britifb 
Treaty — every one of the fame great cities was in oppolition to t/jat inflru- 
ment — but, happily for our country, Walliington did not miflake the clamoursr 
of a multitude in a great city, which />,:jiea/>/e mi-/i think it more prudent to go 
with than to oppofe, in the firfl pcjroxyfms of its rage, for the ■zciH of the people. 
Governor .Sullivan and SherilT Allen tried at that time the effect of oppoli- 
tion. and tiiey had very convincing proofs of tlie wifdom, good fenfe, and rea- 
fon.iblencfs of an infuriated populace. 

It is ridiculous to call the proceedings at the State-Houfe, in Bofton, the 
fenfe of the inhabitants of Maffachufetts. Thofe of us who were near enough 
to Bofton to lift up the fplendid veil with whicli thefe things are covered, 
know, that neither that meeting, nor the one figned by William Cooper, were 
corre»fl cxjireffions of the publick will. 

The hiftory of thefe meetings is briefly this r — Tke cool and judicious men of 
both parties in Bofton, were oppofed to having any meeting on the fubjecft, 
and openly expreffed their difapprobation of them. Not that the inhabitants 
of this metropolis are ever behind tlicir fellow-citizens in their zeal to vindicate , 
the rights, and maintain the honour of their country — but they thought that j 
we were too ignorant of the fadts, and too uncertain of the true courfe to be 
purfucd.to venture to give a decided opinion ujjon tlie fubjeifb. .Such was 
the temper of the inhabitants, when a relpecfl for the citizens of Norfolk, in- 
duced tlie Seleiflmen to call a town-meeting. At this meeting, it is well known 
that fo great an uncertainty prevailed, as to the true policy to be adopted, that I 
the inhabitants, on the propofition to appoint a committee, did not generally 
vote on either fide, and the rcfpe^able Moder.itor, thinking that tlie luke- 
warmnefs tlifcovered was not fufficiently refpetflful for the occalion, intimated 
the |)ropriety of more apparent zeal, and aclually put the qucflion a fecond time. 
This fl.«e of fat'b is well known, and liie Editor of the Aurora, at Philadel- 
phia, lias an arch allulion to it, when he obferved, tliat the refoliitions of Bof- 
ton were force-meat. The Chronicle repeated this wit againfl its own town, 
aiul yet h:u the effrontery to cite thefe refolutions, as exprelVivc of the publick 
will. It may be faid, that this goes to prove that many individuals ac^cd with 
infinccrity. 

I alk. Iiow people muft be cxpe»fted to ai5l in a popular government, when 
the paffion!) are fuddenly and violently inflamed ? Tq foothe m , pcrfuadi, 
ur oppofe and inflame ? 



RD-94 



43 

order to efFeft a change in the adminiftration, or a repeal of tlio 
meafurcs. 

But as this pubhck opinion may be dircfted or forcftalled by 
artful and defigning men, or may be mifdirefted by error or paflion, 
it is not only the right, but the duty of thofe who believe that fuch 
errors exift, to endeavour to correft them. 

When, therefore, a party of men, from finiftcr or from honejl 
motives, mifreprefent the condutl of a foreign nation, prefent an 
unnatural and diftorted view of fafts, appeal to the publick paffions, 
attempt to filence all oppofition, rcprefent our ability to wage war 
in a moft extravagant light, magnify our means of injuring our en- 
emy, and diminifli her power and ability to injure us, and efpecially 
if all this be done while the queftion is ftill open, and before the 
Legiflature, who are alone authorized to decide it, are convened — 
it is the moil fo/emn duty which a citizen is ever called upon to exer- 
cife, to correal fuch falfe ftatements, to remove erroneous impref- 
fions, and to endeavour to conduft his fellow-citizens froin the mazy 
labyrinth of error and prejudice, into the paths of light and truth. 
Such an office I have, with confcious inability, attempted to exe- 
cute : — Happy, if my feeble efforts fhall in any degree contribute 
to preferve my beloved country from the dangers which furround it. 










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